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SOCNET  August 2009

SOCNET August 2009

Subject:

microbiologist blogger attacks Science's network science articles

From:

Barry Wellman <[log in to unmask]>

Reply-To:

Barry Wellman <[log in to unmask]>

Date:

Fri, 28 Aug 2009 12:02:29 -0400

Content-Type:

TEXT/PLAIN

Parts/Attachments:

Parts/Attachments

TEXT/PLAIN (156 lines)

*****  To join INSNA, visit http://www.insna.org  *****

http://www.scientificblogging.com/adaptive_complexity/networks_are_killing_science


 Barry Wellman
 _______________________________________________________________________

  S.D. Clark Professor of Sociology, FRSC               NetLab Director
  Department of Sociology                  725 Spadina Avenue, Room 388
  University of Toronto   Toronto Canada M5S 2J4   twitter:barrywellman
  http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~wellman             fax:+1-416-978-3963
  Updating history:      http://chass.utoronto.ca/oldnew/cybertimes.php
 _______________________________________________________________________


Published on Scientific Blogging (http://www.scientificblogging.com)

Home > Social Sciences > Philosophy & Ethics > Adaptive Complexity >
Printer-friendly
Networks are Killing Science
By adaptivecomplexity
Created Aug 22 2009 - 2:38pm


Here's a little exercise in scientific thinking. What's wrong the approach
to science described in the following passage? (This passage, about
applying network analysis to counterterrorism, is taken from the complex
systems special feature in the July 24th issue of Science.)

    McCulloh and Carley used metanetwork analysis to analyze 1500 videos
made by insurgents in Iraq. "The insurgents would videotape most of their
attacks as propaganda," says McCulloh. "As of March 2006, we had something
like almost three out of every four U.S. deaths [on tape]." Carley
extracted data from these videos, he says, "made a big network out of it,
and ran a fragmentation algorithm which clustered them into little groups.
And when you go back and look at the videos in those groups, you see
forensic clues that identify who some of the insurgent cells were." The
details extracted from the videos are classified, "because we worry that
the insurgents will learn what we're using," McCulloh says. He and Carley
worked with the U.S. military to "operationalize" the technique in Iraq.
U.S. commanders there are faced with too much information and too little
time to act on it. McCulloh says that Carley's metanetwork software helps
them find clues and patternsóboosting the chances of catching or killing
insurgents.

    McCulloh claims that the technique has yielded dramatic results.
"Sniper activity in Iraq is down by 70%," he says, and he's confident that
IED deaths also dropped because of the insights provided by Carley's
programs, although he can't cite data. "It's a simple application of
metanetwork analysis," he says.

    But Sageman is skeptical that military progress in Iraq can be chalked
up to network analysis. "I'm not convinced [metanetworks] have helped at
all," he says. "An easier explanation [for the drop in sniper attacks]
might be the tribal uprising" against the insurgency in Iraq. "There's no
way to know, and that's a big problem with this field in general." Carley
counters that Sageman "doesn't understand the methods."


This passage captures what is wrong with much of econophysics, systems
biology, sociophysics, and almost any field that been tackled by heavily
computational complex systems approaches. Many of these researchers don't
understand what it means to test a theory. They build these complex
models, which involves making important assumptions that could easily be
wrong, and then if their models fit existing data, they think the model is
right.

Hence you get this McColloh guy claiming that his network analysis model
was responsible for a big drop in sniper attacks, ignoring the much more
obvious and plausible causes for the drop in violence: the addition of
30,000 troops and the US Military's major new approach to
counterinsurgency implemented by Petraeus. The network researchers can't
justify ruling out the more obvious explanation; their only retort is to
say that their critics don't understand their fancy methods. (Which is not
true in many cases - there are plenty physicists, biologists, and
economists who understand the mathematical/statistical/computational
techniques, who are bothered by the scientific culture of complex systems
research.)

This a dangerous mindset to have in science. What these researchers are
doing is practicing a sham form of science called by Feynman Cargo Cult
Science:

    There is also a more subtle problem. When you have put a lot of ideas
together to make an elaborate theory, you want to make sure, when
explaining what it fits, that those things it fits are not just the things
that gave you the idea for the theory; but that the finished theory makes
something else come out right, in addition.


And no, that does not mean simply training your model on half of your data
set and showing that you can effectively explain the other half of your
data. You need to be proactive about probing your model for problems. So
your model explains one situation well, now go find another very different
situation and see how well you can explain that. Look for predictions made
by your model that have not been noted in the real-world system before,
and see if your prediction is borne out.

Another example from the same issue of Science:

    Complex-systems experts have also made contributions in epidemiology.
In 2001, Vespignani and colleagues showed that in certain types of highly
connected networks called "scale-free," it's impossible to stop the spread
of an epidemic no matter how many people are inoculated. Conversely, in
2003, Shlomo Havlin, a physicist at Bar-Ilan University in Ramat Gan,
Israel, and colleagues found a simple strategy for inoculating against a
disease that beats picking random individuals. By going a step further and
picking randomly chosen friends of those individuals, health officials
can, on average, inoculate people with more social ties through which to
spread the disease.


Nowhere in the article do you read about any real-world tests of this
model. And you don't see any real world tests in the actual research paper
either. But simply having an untested model is a 'contribution in
epidemiology' apparently worth writing about in a news feature.

At the heart of scientific thinking has to be a strong desire not to fool
yourself, coupled by an understanding of how to actually put that desire
into practice. Complex systems are an important and relevant topic, but
they've been so difficult to tackle because they are messy and hard to
study. It's difficult to find the right simplifying assumptions, and to
make sure that you've considered all of the important factors that go into
the behavior of the system. It's so easy to be wrong.

And so it's sad to see this emerging scientific culture that bizarrely
believes that if you can produce a model that fits the data that inspired
you to build the model, you've actually shown that your model accurately
captures the system. This culture floods the scientific literature with
zero-impact papers, dazzles the computationally naÔve, captures a lot of
air time in the news.

Here's a prediction of my own, one that I'm willing to put to the test: if
complex systems researchers don't get serious about the scientific method,
their field is going to fizzle out, if not crash and burn. Because in the
end you have to move the field forward. The computer models can be
dazzling, but unless they produce a demonstrated string of successes that
end up changing the way everyone in the field thinks - the molecular
biologists, the sociologists, the economists, then the sciences of
complexity will be dismissed as unfruitful. In the end, your model has to
inspire a someone to pick up a pipette and design an experiment.



    * Philosophy & Ethics

ION Publications LLC
Source URL:
http://www.scientificblogging.com/adaptive_complexity/networks_are_killing_science

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